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Session III: Issues Concerning Enforcement and Dispute
Resolution*
Sean Flynn
My name is Sean Flynn. I'm from American University, Washington College of
Law where I direct our LLM program, teach International Intellectual Property, and
run research and advocacy projects.
I will talk a bit about the politics of international intellectual property, and
specifically about ISDS-Investor State Dispute Settlement.

I.

POLITICAL CONTEST AND REGIME SHIFTING IN
INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW

International intellectual property law, especially over the last twenty years or so,
has been an incredibly contested field. The last big treaty in this area-the AntiCounterfeiting Trade Agreement'-was met on its release by the mobilization of
roughly 300,000 people across Europe marching in the streets.2 People were
marching to oppose the substance of the agreement. They believed that its measures
combatting piracy were invading personal rights and the liberties of Internet users.
And they opposed the treaty's process. People marched against the treaty's highly
secretive process. They demanded that rules with such general applications should
be subject to more democratic processes.3
There is struggle not just on the streets, but between industry groups. Steve
mentioned the potential differences of perspectives between the tech community on
one side-the Googles, Yahoos, Facebooks of the world-and the content producers
on the other-the movie and music industries.' Copyright is subject to intense
political debate, and those debates are what I call "nested."'
Struggles between owner rights to exclude and public and technology industry
rights to access recur at different levels of the process. And that process itself shifts
between forums. From local legislatures to courts. From national systems to bilateral
*
These remarks are adapted from the transcript of a talk that was given on October 14, 2016, at
the Kernochan Center Annual Symposium at Columbia Law School.
I. Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA), opened for signature May 1, 2011,
https://perma.cc/X3R8-Z6KQ.
2. Eric Pfanner, EuropeansReject Treaty to Combat Digital Piracy, N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 2012, at
B5.
3. Id.
4. Steven Metalitz, Session : Keynote Panel, Describingthe Legal Landscape, 40 COLUM. J.L.
& ARTS 319 (2017).
5. See Duncan Kennedy, Semiotics of Legal Argument, appendix (discussing genealogy of the
nesting idea from Claude Levi Strauss).
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trade deals. From bilateral deals to multilateral institutions like the World
Intellectual Property Organization. And back down again. Following Larry Helfer,
we call this aspect of the field "regime shifting." 6 The idea is that these debates find
themselves occurring and recurring in different kinds of international political
forums.7
This morning, we started with the Berne Convention. 8 That was a multilateral
treaty-a treaty originally negotiated with Western European countries. Developing
countries if they were present were there as colonies of the Western countries. One
of the slides showed Tunisia as an original Berne member. Tunisia was a French
colony at the time. It wasn't actually negotiating on its own behalf.
The Berne Convention's implementation institution evolves into the World
Intellectual Property Organization ("WIPO") after World War II. By the 1980s,
when the U.S. actually joins that convention, WIPO is a true multilateral organization
made up of most of the countries of the UN.
From WIPO the main international intellectual property norm setting shifts in the
1990s to the World Trade Organization. There we have, from 1994, the TRIPS
agreement. 9 In the WTO, intellectual property was negotiated in conjunction with
other trade issues so that it became something you can trade off. If you want some
kind of an advantage in the agriculture chapter, then you might have to give up
something in the patent chapter.
We are in a post-TRIPs stage now. In the post-TRIPS period the main forums are
shifting back down. It shifted first, in the late 1990s and early 2000s, to bilateral free
trade agreements. Then it shifted again to plurilateral free trade agreements, such as
ACTA and the Trans Pacific Partnership Agreement.
All of these different levels operate under different processes and create different
kinds of intellectual property commitments.
At the current moment, there is a lot of doubt about those processes. ACTA failed
to be ratified by the EU and U.S. TPP doesn't have any presidential contenders that
want to put it before Congress.' 0 It's questionable whether the TPP will come up
before Congress for ratification at all. If it does - it is questionable whether it will
be voted up or down.
The political discussion thus ends at this moment of contestation and unclear
trajectories. If neither TPP nor ACTA go into effect-if the latest regime shift ends
in failure-where does the regime shift to next?

6.
Laurence R. Helfer, Regime Shifting: The TRIPS Agreement and New Dynamics of
InternationalIntellectualProperty Lawmaking, 29 YALE J. INT'L L. 1 (2004).

7.

Id

8.

Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, as revised

on July 24, 1971 and as amended in 1979, S. Treaty Doc. No. 99-27, https://perma.cc/ZB2N-HVDE.
9.

Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, 1869

U.N.T.S. 299,33 I.L.M. 1197 [hereinafter "TRIPS Agreement"], https://perma.cc/SWM3-MXRS.
10.

See Rebecca Savransky, Trump to sign executive order to withdrawfrom TPP, THE HILL (Jan.

23, 2017), https://perma.cc/5R39-BGK4.
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II. REGIME SHIFTING AND ISDS
There are two main answers to the question of where we might be shifting to next.
One is that the field might shift back into the multilateral agenda. "E-commerce"
issues are being discussed in the World Trade Organization, and there seems to be a
lot of energy around that. Perhaps an e-commerce negotiation at the WTO will be
the next big international agenda for the field.
The other answer is that the agenda shifts out of norm setting and into
enforcement. The idea, mentioned by some in the content industry earlier today, is
that maybe we've met the high watermark of treaty making and what we're really
going to do is focus on enforcement of existing rules.
Enforcement itself is the subject of regime shifting. Enforcement of treaties
through dispute resolution is shifting out of traditional state-to-state mechanisms like
the WTO. These traditional dispute resolution mechanisms can be thought of as
horizontal in the sense that they regulate and involve only state actors. But there is a
recent shift of international intellectual property treaty interpretation and
enforcement into investor state dispute settlement ("ISDS") that is vertical in its
application-it provides the ability of state actors to be sued by individual citizens
or corporations.
ISDS is new to the field of international intellectual property. ISDS standards are
not in intellectual property chapters of trade agreements, nor are they mentioned in
any international intellectual property treaty. They are rather included in separate
investment agreements and chapters of trade agreements. These provisions are
negotiated by completely different people.
USTR's intellectual property
negotiators-people like Probir Mehta and Stan McCoy, who are here today-were
negotiating intellectual property chapters, not investment chapters. The investment
chapters were negotiated by investment lawyers who live in a different part of the
building; they live in a different kind of world.
The separation of those worlds changed in 2013 when Eli Lilly sued Canada in an
ISDS forum created by NAFTA over a judicial decision that revoked a patent.' It
was a patent on a second use of a known chemical. 1 2 The patent was revoked for not
meeting Canada's definition of their utility doctrine implemented through what they
called the "promise doctrine." Eli Lilly failed in its applications up through the court
system to convince judges that its second use patent met this Canadian doctrine.
When it finally lost, it said: well, we're going to invoke NAFTA. We're going to
say that that invalidation of the patent by your courts has "expropriated" our
investment in that patent. 13
NAFTA itself does not define intellectual property as investment. But the TPP
does and post-NAFTA free trade agreements do. And NAFTA defines "intangible"

11. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Canada, [2014] ICSID Case No. UNCT/14/2.
12. Id.
13. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Canada, [2013] ICSID Case No. JNCT/14/2, Notice of Intent to Submit a
Claim to Arbitration Under NAFTA Chapter Eleven.
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4
property as a type of investment that can be subject to expropriations analysis.1 And
so that part of the analysis is relatively solved-the confiscation of intellectual
property can indeed be an investment protected by an investment chapter.
That part is not particularly new. It is not particularly controversial. We have had
treaties since the 1950s that cover the direct expropriation of intangible property.
What changed with NAFTA is that it is the first FTA to include both an investment
chapter extending to intellectual property expropriations and an intellectual property
chapter having substantive rules about what your intellectual property norms should
look like.' 5 It also protected not only direct expropriations but so-called "indirect"
expropriations. The intellectual property chapter, like the 200 previous years of
international intellectual property law, is enforceable through state-to-state
adjudication. But the negotiators for the first time had to address the relationship
between the two chapters. Could the investor-state process be used to enforce the
intellectual property commitments by claiming that failure to do so constituted an
indirect expropriation of intellectual property rights?
To address that relationship, there is a clause in NAFTA that provides a carve-out
from the investment chapter of a series of intellectual property decisions. Article
1110(7) states:

This Article does not apply to the issuance of compulsory licenses granted in relation
to intellectual property rights, or to the revocation, limitation or creation of intellectual
property rights, to the extent that such issuance, revocation, limitation or creation is
consistent with Chapter Seventeen (Intellectual Property).
This same clause reappears in the TPP and all other post-NAFTA free trade
agreements. The TPP language adds TRIPS to the list of rules that the decisions
6
must be "consistent with" to take advantage of the carve-out.' And so the question
is: do these clauses protect IP decisions from ISDS litigation or expose IP decisions
to ISDS litigation?
Eli Lilly's briefs in the NAFTA case argue the latter. The say in essence that the
"consistent with" clause bootstraps in a private right of action under the treaty against
a state for breach of the intellectual property chapter (or, in TPP, TRIPS). '7 If this
argument prevails, we will have capacitated an entirely new forum to define what
international intellectual property law means.
ISDS is not part of public international law. ISDS forums are part of private
international law. They are arbitration forums. And this fact brings with it important
procedural differences. ISDS forums are not staffed by judges; they're usually

14. North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., art. 1721, Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M.
289 (1993) ("Intellectual property rights refers to copyright and related rights, trademark rights, patent
rights, rights in layout designs of semiconductor integrated circuits, trade secret rights, plant breeders'
rights, rights in geographical indications and industrial design rights.").
John Terry et al., NAFTA: the first trade treaty to protect IP rights, INTELL. ASSET MGMT.
15.

MAG., https://perma.cc/P65C-4M8D (last visited Feb. 6, 2017).
16. Trans-Pacific Partnership, ch. 18.1, Feb. 4, 2016, https://perma.cc/M8SX-2UTA ("Intellectual
property refers to all categories of intellectual property that are the subject of Sections 1 through 7 of Part

II of the TRIPS Agreement.").
17. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Canada, [2014] ICSID Case No. UNCT/14/2.
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staffed by arbitrators who in their daytime are arbitration lawyers-arbitration
lawyers who represent clients (usually private clients). The forums themselves,
depending on which agreement you're talking about, don't have public hearings or
public records. Depending on what forum you're bringing these in, they may or may
not allow third parties to file amicus briefs. They may or may not allow other
countries with interests in the outcome to intervene.
Nor do ISDS forums have any kind of appellate mechanism on any issues of law
that they might get wrong. So these are bodies that are seen to be empowered to
interpret intellectual property chapters-and even a multilateral intellectual property
agreement-with essentially none of the trappings of law that you would expect in a
public international law body such as the WTO.
III. ISDS REGIME SHIFTING IN INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY SCHOLARSHIP
The shift of international intellectual property adjudication into ISDS forums has
triggered a new spate of international intellectual property law scholarship. This
scholarship has thus far focused on three main implications of the shift of IP into
ISDS: reconceptualization, capture, and fragmentation.

A.

RECONCEPTUALIZATION

Some scholars focus on the potential of the shift of IP into ISDS to reconceptualize
what disputes in the field are, and should be, about.' 8 These scholars worry that ISDS
forums ask different questions than those that lie at heart of intellectual property
doctrine. They point out that intellectual property is a policy tool that entails policy
balances, including the weighing of consumer interests. Different industries have
different interests, consumers have different interests than industries. Intellectual
property ultimately must balance those interests through implementing doctrines
defining the scope of rights, limitations and exceptions, terms of protections, et
cetera.
The reconceptualization scholars worry about what happens when you take these
questions into forums with a different focus. The questions in investment forums are
not asking what best promotes creativity or innovation balanced against the interests
of libraries and consumers in society. They're asking, "Was there an investment
backed decision in the country and was that investment taken away?" This
reconceptualization of the question appears to bracket all these social and public
interests that we international intellectual property lawyers see as the heart of
intellectual property law and policy.

18.
See Rochelle Dreyfuss & Susy Frankel, Article, From Incentive to Commodity to Asset: How
InternationalLaw is Reconceptualizing Intellectual Property, 36 MICH. J. INT'L L. 557 (2015); Ruth L.
Okediji, Essay, Is Intellectual Property "Investment"? Eli Lilly v. Canada and the International

Intellectual Property System, 35 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 1121 (2014).
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CAPTURE

9
Others frame the problem in the terms of court capture.1 The concern is like, and
comes from, the literature on agency capture. The question here is whether courts
can be captured like agencies so that the courts themselves start to operate in the
interests of those before them. All the process problems I just mentioned lead people
to think yes. There is a small amount of empirical literature on ISDS generally that
20
attempts to cast some light on this matter.

C.

FRAGMENTATION

2
The final concern is of fragmentation in the system of law. 1 The kind of question
that arises here includes-if you are interpreting the law, shouldn't there be a
Supreme Court? Shouldn't there be some kind of international hierarchy of
interpretations so that when somebody gets it wrong you can appeal it to someone
who can get it right? And even if that body gets it wrong, at least it's wrong the same
everywhere?
You can imagine the international arbitration and substantive treaty systems as
kind of like state and federal constitutional systems. They can each have their own
rules. But at some point, there should be an ability to appeal from the state system
to the federal system, such as where the state system interpretations inhibit Federal
rights. But there's nothing like that in the international system. We built this really
big, relatively well respected system in the WTO with permanent appellate bodies,
with open hearings, with amicus processes, with all the things that are lacking in
ISDS. But there's no connection between the two systems. The Eli Lilly tribunal
could get it wrong. They could say that a judicial decision to revoke a wrongly
granted patent has had its rights violated by TRIPS, and there could be no ability to
appeal that decision to the real people in charge of interpreting TRIPS.

19.

1 take the term from Jonas Anderson, Works-in-Progress Intellectual Property Colloquium,

February 10-11, 2017, Boston University School of Law.
20.

See Susan D. Franck & Lindsey E. Wylie, Article, PredictingOutcomes in Investment Treaty

Arbitration, 65 DUKE L.J. (2015).
21.
See Peter K. Yu, The Investment-Related Aspects ofIntellectualProperty Rights, 66 AM. U.L.
REv. 829 (2017); Cynthia Ho, A Collision Course between TRIPS Flexibilities and Investor-State
Proceedings, 22 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. (forthcoming 2017).

